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Abstract
Tizen is a new Linux-based open source platform for
consumer devices including smartphones, televisions,
vehicles, and wearables. While Tizen provides kernel-
level mandatory policy enforcement, it has a large col-
lection of libraries, implemented in a mix of C and C++,
which make their own security checks. In this research,
we describe the design and engineering of a static anal-
ysis engine which drives a full information flow analysis
for apps and a control flow analysis for the full library
stack. We implemented these static analyses as exten-
sions to LLVM, requiring us to improve LLVM’s native
analysis features to get greater precision and scalability,
including knotty issues like the coexistence of C++ in-
heritance with C function pointer use. With our tools, we
found several unexpected behaviors in the Tizen system,
including paths through the system libraries that did not
have inline security checks. We show how our tools can
help the Tizen app store to verify important app prop-
erties as well as helping the Tizen development process
avoid the accidental introduction of subtle vulnerabili-
ties.
1 Introduction
Static analysis has proven to be wildly successful in find-
ing all sorts of bugs, whether related to security or other
flaws, so the availability of a new system to analyze for
bugs is an interesting opportunity to see how good these
tools can be. To that end, we had the opportunity to de-
sign and implement static analyses for Tizen, a new op-
erating system platform that will soon run on a variety
of Samsung products including televisions, wearables,
automobile telematics systems, and smartphones. This
paper describes the analysis challenges presented by the
Tizen platform, as distinct from competing platforms like
Android, along with the tools we developed and the is-
sues we found.
We’ll describe the Tizen architecture in more detail
later, but at a high level Tizen is a variant of Linux, with
kernel-enforced mandatory access control rules. Appli-
cations can be built entirely from HTML5 web primitives
(JavaScript, etc.), much as was done in Palm’s WebOS,
or they can be built natively, using a variety of C and C++
standard libraries. Tizen has a series of permissions that
can be granted to applications in a fashion similar to An-
droid, which are then enforced both at a low-level, using
the kernel, along with higher-level checks embedded in
the libraries. Native apps will be distributed as LLVM
bitcode—a portable, machine-independent intermediate
code representation that’s naturally amenable to static
analysis via the LLVM toolchain. We presume there will
be a centralized Tizen app store—Samsung just opened
TizenStore.com in January of this year—that can con-
duct analyses over Tizen apps to ensure their safety prior
to being downloaded to Tizen users1. In a recent talk,
Samsung’s partner, AhnLabs, described a mixed process
with both static and dynamic analysis as well as human
analysts [1, 56].
In deciding what aspects of the Tizen system were
interesting for a security-related static analyses, we de-
cided to focus our attention on higher-level security top-
ics. For native Tizen apps, we concluded that it would
be most helpful to have a general-purpose LLVM infor-
mation flow analysis tool that could identify apps con-
taining undesired flows, such as from the user’s contacts
list to the network. We envision this automated analysis
being conducted mechanically in an app store alongside
a human analyst who studies the effectiveness of vari-
ous source/sink pairs, amending the rules as needed. The
goals of this tool are to run quickly and to produce use-
ful evidence that can quickly allow safe apps to be ap-
1While the authors of this paper are blinded for review, we note
that we do not represent Samsung, Intel, or any other commercial com-
pany involved in Tizen. All the work presented here is based on pub-
lic information including Samsung’s open-source release of the Tizen
codebase.
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proved, allowing human analysts to spend more of their
time digging into suspicious apps with unusual behav-
iors. We prefer information flow analyses over more
primitive cataloging of privileged operations, as done in
the Tizen store presently [1, 56], because we hypothe-
size it will result in fewer false positives. For example, if
a privacy-sensitive advertising library downloaded sev-
eral ad variants, selecting one for display based on how
well it matches platform-local private information about
the user, this would be far less concerning than leaking
that same private information over the network for the
decision to be made remotely. While both variants use
the same permissions, information flow can distinguish
the good from the bad.
For the Tizen system libraries, written in a mix of
C and C++ and containing internal security checks that
make them part of the system’s sizable trusted comput-
ing base, we face a larger challenge. These libraries en-
force security properties while they are simultaneously
linked to the same address space as the potentially hos-
tile apps that call them. We consequently expect that the
Tizen app store will need to statically analyze apps to
ensure they only branch to approved entry points in the
system libraries and that they don’t exploit unsafe prop-
erties of the C language (e.g., indexing beyond the end of
an array, overwriting a function pointer, and branching
to a forbidden target). Such “safety” analyses are well
within the province of existing commercial tools, so we
didn’t implement them. Furthermore, apps built using
the web stack (JavaScript, etc.) call into the very same
libraries, pointing to the importance of validating these
entry points’ use of security checks.
Consequently, we decided to implement a control flow
analysis over the native libraries in order to discover
whether there are paths through the libraries that are
missing security checks, and thus might indicate ex-
ploitable flaws that such a “safety” analysis in the app
store might otherwise approve. Unlike our information
flow analysis for Tizen apps, we envision this Tizen li-
brary analysis to be something that can run for hours,
if not days, in the service of Tizen system developers’
internal bug finding. Likewise, we envision that Tizen
system developers would be able to add trusted code an-
notations to inform this analysis, although it’s essential
that such annotations be few and far between, in order to
minimize friction to the adoption of our tool.
The rest of this paper describes Tizen in more detail
(Section 2), then presents our LLVM-based static anal-
ysis engine (Section 3). We follow with our analysis of
Tizen apps (Section 4) and API libraries (Section 5). We
discuss pragmatic issues (Section 6). We wrap up with
prior work (Section 7) and conclusions (Section 8).
2 Background
The Tizen platform [55] is an operating system based
on the Linux kernel and the GNU standard C library.
It includes a graphics layer based on the Enlightenment
Foundation Libraries and the X Window System.
Tizen already runs on smartphones [50], wearables
such as watches [46], cameras [48], vehicle infotain-
ment systems [47], TVs [49] and in the future refriger-
ators, air conditioners and washing machines [43]. Con-
sequently, its security properties become quite important.
The Tizen libraries are implemented as a C++ layer of
programmer-accessible APIs built on top of a C layer
of APIs that are deliberately hidden from the application
programmers. The intention is that that application pro-
grammers won’t deal, for example, with the X Window
System, but rather will use Tizen’s official graphics APIs.
2.1 Tizen Applications
Applications can either be based on HTML5 or native
apps. This paper focuses on security analysis of the na-
tive applications, which use the C standard library and
additional Tizen APIs that offer access to phone calling
and contacts, SMS, networking, Bluetooth, and other ser-
vices as shown in Figure 1.
The availability and wide range of these APIs makes
Tizen a unique target for analysis since the entirety
of kernel, standard libraries, standardized application
platform and the applications themselves are written in
C/C++ and compiled to native code2 and are, in effect,
all within the trusted computing base of the platform.
2.2 Tizen Privileges
The main mechanism for enforcing privacy and security
for applications is a system of privileges, functionally
similar to that of Android. The application privileges are
displayed to the user ahead of installation, with applica-
tions only being downloaded and installed once the user
accepts the privileges that the application requires.
From a security standpoint, the use of C/C++ for the
Tizen libraries—widely known as difficult to analyze
with its use of function pointers, aliased arrays and deep
class hierarchies—together with the existence of rich ap-
plication APIs, each with their own associated permis-
sions, makes determining the correctness of Tizen’s priv-
ilege system a serious challenge. Even for Android,
where privileges are enforced outside of a potentially
2The distribution format for native apps will actually be LLVM’s
bitcode IR. This intermediate representation, much like Android’s
Dalvik, will be compiled at install-time to the platform’s native CPU
architecture.
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Figure 1: Tizen application development stack. In this paper, we focus on the native applications stack.
hostile application’s address space, researchers have dis-
covered multiple permissions inconsistencies inside the
OS libraries [21] and several different types of permis-
sion misconfiguration [51, 21], leading to application
over-privilege [59] and increased application vulnerabil-
ity [2, 53].
While, to the best of our knowledge, Tizen does not
have a security document explaining the rules of privi-
lege enforcement, by analyzing the code, we observed
the following rules.
• As a first layer of defense, applications are checked
for security vulnerabilities before their inclusion in
the web store.
• Second, an access controller invoked by each
privileged API denies access to the native APIs
for which an application does not have the priv-
ilege. This is done by including a call to
CheckPrivilege(privilege_name).
• Third, since checks done in the application process
may be avoided by an attacker, protected actions
are performed or information is retrieved from other
service processes, which perform their own check-
ing for permissions.
• At the bottom level, the inter-process communica-
tion and data access is protected by a kernel-level
security module (SMACK), described below.
On its surface, this appears to be an example of defense
in depth, i.e., perhaps the higher-layer checks are unnec-
essary and SMACK can carry all the security burden, but
we hypothesize that the checks at each layer are neces-
sary, as higher-level API semantics may be lost when
control flow reaches the system-call boundary. SMACK
may not have adequate context to make every security
decision correctly on its own.
2.3 SMACK
Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel (SMACK)
is a Linux kernel module and associated utilities that
allow setting custom mandatory access control (MAC)
rules to protect data and limit process interaction.
The combination of mandatory access control policies
and API privileges for more fine-grained permissions is
the standard combination of protection mechanisms in
Android, which has its own permissions API and system-
level enforcement. Recent versions of Android also in-
clude SELinux, which can enforce policies similar to
SMACK.
SMACK relies on labeling system objects and
then applying rules, based on those labels, to
allow or prevent access. Its rules format is
subject-label object-label access, where
subject-label is the SMACK label of the task,
object-label is the SMACK label of the object being
accessed, and access is a string specifying the type of
access allowed. We note that the SELinux policy for
Linux 2.4.19 consists of over 50,000 policy statements,
including over 700 subject types and 100,000 permission
assignments [32]. While Tizen’s SMACK is simpler
than SELinux, Tizen 2.1 has 41,000 lines of SMACK
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access rules [52]. It’s manifestly unclear whether these
rules are “correct” or how to even define correctness
over them.
3 Static Analysis Engine
The motivation for this work is to identify security bugs
in a C/C++ code base through static analysis. The code
base could be a mobile application (i.e., a Tizen app) or
an operating system (i.e., Tizen). We built our analysis
infrastructure on top of the LLVM framework. Figure 2
shows the basic flow of our analysis system. The C/C++
code is compiled and translated to LLVM bitcode by the
Clang [39] compiler. The bitcode is input to the LLVM-
based analysis engine, which performs various informa-
tion flow-based analyses to identify security bugs. The
analysis is driven by user-specified analysis rules, e.g.
pairs of taint source and taint sink functions.
C/C++ code
Clang LLVM bitcode LLVM based Analysis Engine
user specified 
analysis rules
security bugs
Figure 2: The Basic Workflow
This section will describe the analysis engine, includ-
ing the basic components, workflow and the mechanism
used to identify two types of security bugs. The LLVM-
based analysis engine applies static analysis to the input
bitcode and identifies security bugs, i.e. flows that vi-
olate the analysis rules. Section 3.1 gives an overview
of the software architecture of the analysis engine. Sec-
tion 3.2 describes the static analysis techniques used in
this engine and the interactions among them. The last
two sections describe how the analysis finds privilege er-
rors and taint pairs in two different kinds of code bases:
i.e. Tizen applications and the Tizen operating system.
3.1 Structure of Analysis Engine
Figure 3 shows the structure of our analysis engine,
which is built on the LLVM framework (the bold boxes
indicate components that we have added). The engine
takes LLVM bitcode as input and translates it into an
in-memory LLVM intermediate representation (a three-
address static-single assignment based IR). A client anal-
ysis is a static information flow analysis (SIFA) that runs
on the LLVM IR and identifies security bugs. To as-
sist the client analysis, a series of auxiliary analyses are
invoked to create additional in-memory information, in-
cluding the heap static-single assignment (HSSA) form
(more detail is provided in Section 3.2), class hierarchy
information, class type information and the call graph.
The “refined in-memory LLVM IR” is the in-memory
LLVM IR augmented by this additional information.
LLVM bitcode
IR Generator in memory LLVM IR
HSSA 
Builder
Class Type 
Analysis
Pointer 
Analysis
Global Value 
Numbering
Call Graph 
Builder
refined in memory 
LLVM IR 
Client 
Analysis 1
Client 
Analysis 2
Client 
Analysis n
...
Class 
Hierarchy 
Analysis
Figure 3: The Internal Workflow for LLVM based Anal-
ysis Engine
Here we summarize the functionality of the auxiliary
analyses & transformations, and the interactions between
them:
• Class Hierarchy Analysis (CHA): builds the class
hierarchy graph for C++ code;
• HSSA builder: constructs the HSSA form;
• Pointer Analysis (PTA): intra-procedural pointer
analysis;
• Global Value Numbering (GVN): global value num-
bering based on PTA;
• Class Type Analysis (CTA): this is a flow-sensitive
class type analysis that is based on CHA, HSSA,
PTA and GVN;
• Call Graph Builder (CG): the call graph construc-
tion based on CTA which can precisely identify the
invoked virtual function calls, including function
pointer invocations.
3.2 Basic Techniques
This section gives a more detailed description of the
functionality of the auxiliary analyses and transforma-
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tions. The pointer analysis (PTA) and global value num-
bering (GVN) are standard LLVM analysis modules. The
pointer analysis is an intra-procedural stateless analy-
sis that uses allocation sites to distinguish memory ad-
dresses. The global value numbering uses alias infor-
mation produced by pointer analysis to number the heap
variables that have distinct values.
3.2.1 Class Type Analysis
In C++ code, the analysis needs to identify a minimal
set of possible class types in the presence of class in-
heritance. This helps the call graph builder to precisely
identify the target of virtual function calls. The first step
of class type analysis (CTA) is class hierarchy analysis
(CHA), which examines the class information to build
the tree structure that represents the C++ class hierar-
chy. Figure 4 (a) gives a simple class hierarchy example,
where classes B and C are subclasses of class A. The
class hierarchy tree is presented in Figure 4 (b).
The next step of CTA is to start from class instantia-
tion sites and propagate class type information via vari-
ables’ def-use chains. LLVM provides scalar variable-
based SSA form to represent def-use information for
scalar variables. For heap variables, CTA needs assis-
tance from pointer analysis. In Figure 4 (c), the example
code presents a case where pointer analysis information
can disambiguate class types. In Line 5, the value of vari-
able m is loaded from p→x, which can be an instance of
class B or C. To identify the type of variable m, we need
to know if variables p and q are aliased or not. If from
pointer analysis we know that p and q cannot be aliased,
then m’s class type is B, and the invoked function foo in
Line 6 is B::foo. Otherwise, both B::foo and C::foo may
be invoked at Line 6.
We now describe an interprocedural, flow- and field-
sensitive class type analysis that starts from class in-
stantiation sites and propagates class type information
via variables’ def-use chains. The def-use information
is built upon both scalar SSA (for scalar variables) and
HSSA (for heap variables, see more details in the next
section). For each scalar variable defined, all of its uses
are checked and their class types are updated. If the use
is a merge φ function, a meet update operation is per-
formed, i.e. merging the class type into the merge φ
function’s class type set. For each heap variable defined,
all of its may-alias uses are checked and their class types
are updated (i.e. merging the class type into the heap
variable’s class type set). The operation of the heap vari-
able’s merge φ is the same as for scalar variables.
3.2.2 Heap Static-Single Analysis Form
Information flow analysis discovers the flow of values
between variables in a given application. The variables
can be scalar or heap variables. Heap SSA (HSSA)
form [23] is used to represent the definitions and uses of
heap variables, i.e. class/struct field and array accesses in
the C/C++ context. For each heap variable definition and
use, a pseudo-variable Hi is used to annotate the heap
variable access, where a dφ function is used for defini-
tions and a uφ function for uses. The dφ and uφ func-
tions take the heap address (e.g., p) and offset (e.g., the
offset of struct Info’s field x) as input parameters that rep-
resent the heap position. Similar to scalar SSA, a merge
φ node is used to merge dφ or uφ nodes where con-
trol flow edges join. Figure 4 (d) shows the transformed
HSSA form from Figure 4 (c). Two dφ functions (i.e.,
H1 and H2) are added to heap definitions at Lines 1 and
3, one uφ (i.e., H4) is added to a heap use at Line 4, and
a merge φ node is used to merge H1 and H2.
Recall from the CTA algorithm, that class type infor-
mation can be propagated via HSSA def-use chains. At
Line 1, H1 is assigned class type B. H2 is assigned class
type C. H1 propagates its class type information through
HSSA def-use chains, and reaches H4 as a use, since H1
and H4 are must-aliases. So H4 takes on class type B. For
variable m at line 4, its class types depend on the type of
p and q, since the definition of H4 comes from H3 which
merges H1 and H2. If p and q may aliases, then m takes
class type B and C. If p and q must not alias, then m
takes class type B only. Building the HSSA form simpli-
fies the manipulation of heap variables for analysis. The
may/must alias checking gets help from pointer analysis
or value numbering (i.e., the GVN in LLVM).
For function invocations, HSSA connects those call
sites whose target functions have a side effect (i.e. a load
or store of a heap variable). For example, a uφ function
is assigned to the invocation of function foo at Line 5 in
Figure 4 (d), since function foo performs a load operation
on heap variable B::val.
3.2.3 Call Graph Construction
As discussed above, precise call graph construction (CG)
for C++ code needs precise class type information to
identify virtual function calls. Based on the CTA analysis
output, the CG builder starts from entry functions. In this
paper, entry functions are the main functions and event
handler functions in the Tizen OS code base and mobile
applications. For each indirect function invocation (i.e.,
invocation via a function pointer), if it is a virtual func-
tion invocation (i.e., the function pointer is loaded from a
class object’s virtual table), the target object’s class type
information is used to identify target functions. For a
non-virtual indirect function invocation, CG builder uses
5
class A {
public:
  virtual void foo(int r);
  int val;
};
class B : public A {
public:
  virtual void foo(int r);
};
class C : public A {
public:
  virtual void foo(int r);
};
a.
   typedef struct { A* x; int y; } Info;
  
   int main(int argc, char** argv) {
     Info* p, q;
     … 
 1: p->x = new B();
 2: if (argc > 1)
 3:    q->x = new C();
     }
 4:  A* m = p->x;
 5:  m->foo(val); // B::foo or C::foo ?
  ...
c.
void foo
Class A
void foo
Class B
void foo
Class C
b.
   … 
1:   p->x = new B();  H1 = dphi(H0, p, x);
2:  if (argc > 1) {
3:     q->x = new C(); H2 = dphi(H1, q, x);
    }
    H3 = mphi(H1, H2);
4: A* m = p->x; H4 = uphi(H3, p, x);
5: m->foo(val); H5 = uphi(H4);
...
  void B::foo(int r) {
  …
     int x = this->val; H1 = uphi(H0, this, val);
  } 
d.
Figure 4: The Class Type Analysis Example
pointer analysis information to identify the target func-
tions.
3.3 Handling C/C++ Features
C/C++ has features that pose difficulties for static anal-
ysis, such as the coexistence of C++ inheritance with C
function pointer use, the coexistence of classes/structs,
and array elements accesses in the form of offsets from
pointers. SIFA’s call graph construction, as described
above, integrates the handling of invocations through
function pointers with the handling of virtual function
calls. SIFA extends Heap SSA (HSSA) form [23] to
represent memory accesses through class/struct field ac-
cesses and arrays in a uniform way. The original work in
heap SSA only supported Java objects, and was extended
for C/C++ objects in this work.
4 Tizen Application Analysis
The Tizen application analysis is an interprocedural
SIFA analysis that identifies pairs of taint source and
sinks for the given application code. The taint source and
sink pairs are defined by user-specified rules, i.e. the taint
source function as the key and a set of taint sink functions
as values. Taint analysis can be used to model different
security issues, such as privacy leaks and unauthorized
resource access. Here we focus on privacy leaks. The
analysis engine loads the user-defined taint source and
sink map into memory, and analyzes the mobile appli-
cation code (represented as LLVM IR) to identify taint
source function invocations.
Like all data flow analyses, taint analysis defines an
associated lattice and meet function. The top element
of the lattice is Untainted. The bottom element of the
lattice is Tainted. These are the only two lattice el-
ements. A variable definition is assumed to be initial-
ized to Untainted, and becomes Tainted if it is as-
signed to by an expression containing a tainted value.
Where a definition is assigned to by a φ -function, it
becomes Tainted if any of the arguments of the φ -
function are tainted. Thus the meet operation for the
lattice is defined as: meet(Tainted, Untainted) =
Tainted. For each taint source function invocation,
the tainted value is propagated through scalar SSA and
HSSA def-use chains. When a taint source reaches a
corresponding sink function, then a taint pair is identi-
fied and reported to output.
     … 
     x= TaintSource();    
     p->y = x + 99;
     evaluate(p);
     …
  void evaluate(Info* p) {
     int m = p->y;
     TaintSink(m);
  ...
a.
     … 
     x= TaintSource();  H1 = dphi(H0)
     p->y = x + 99; H2 = dphi(H1, p, y);
     evaluate(p);    H3 = uphi(H4, p, y);
     …
  void evaluate(Info* p) {
     int m = p->y; H11 = uphi(H0, p, x);
     TaintSink(m); H12 = uphi(H11);
  ...
b.
Figure 5: Example of Interprocedural Taint Analysis
Figure 5 (a) shows an example where a taint source
and sink are identified across procedure boundaries. The
TaintSource function is invoked and produces the result
value x that should be marked as tainted. By propagating
through dataflow analysis, all variables in the computa-
tion reached by the tainted value are marked as tainted.
In the function evaluate, the sink function TaintSink is in-
voked and has tainted variable m as input. Thus the taint
source reaching its corresponding taint sink is identified.
To illustrate the dataflow traversal, Figure 5 (b) gives
the HSSA version of the code, and the arrow lines show
the taint lattice value propagation through the scalar and
heap variable def-use chains.
We perform taint analysis in time that is linear in the
size of the HSSA graph. The implementation is currently
context insensitive.
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4.1 Implicit Flows
Our static taint analysis, unlike existing tools ( [54, 57,
3]), identifies implicit flows [35] due to control depen-
dences between (source, sink) pairs. This is needed to
ensure that a malicious program cannot sidestep the taint
flow policy rules through tricky conditionals and control
flows. Our method integrates control-based and dataflow
propagation for taint analysis.
For each function, the analysis tracks implicit flows by
identifying control predicates and the statements that are
control dependent on them. A prepass inserts pseudo-
uses of the control predicate for each such definition,
effectively turning the control dependence relation into
a dataflow relation through which the analysis engine
propagates taints. If the control predicate is tainted, the
taint analysis classifies all variable definitions control de-
pendent on the predicate as tainted. To implement this,
control predicates are inserted as pseudo uses in each
conditional statement prior to the taint analysis.
Consider the code example in Figure 6:
     … 
     x= TaintSource();    
     if (x < 0) {
         y1 = 0; // pseudo_use(x);
     } else {
         y2 = 1; // pseudo_use(x);
     }
     // Taint propagates from y1 and y2 
     y3 = phi(y1, y2);
     TaintSink(y3);
  ...
Figure 6: Example for Pseudo-Use
In the code example, the tainting of x is propagated to
y1 and y2 through the insertion of pseudo uses. Thus y3 is
tainted, and so a privacy leak occurs at TaintSink(y3).
4.2 Input Rules
Taint rule specification is usually done by identifying
sources and sinks at the API level, but this may lead
to unnecessary loss of precision, especially for lan-
guages such as C and C++ that need to account for ref-
erence parameters, pointer parameters and inheritance.
We allow for a more refined specification in which the
source and sink are identified as specific API param-
eters (including return values) of APIs. For exam-
ple, it is possible that a security analyst may consider
image, but not metadata, to be a taint source in an API
call like GetImage(&image, &metadata). Likewise,
filename, but not mode, may be considered to be a taint
sink in an API call like OpenFile(filename, mode).
4.3 Callback functions
Callback functions pose an interesting challenge because
they can enable “hidden” information flow via event-
driven execution. Consider for instance, the snippet of
code (shown in Figure 7) in which an application uses a
callback function to preview a snapshot captured by the
camera device:
  … 
  class FaceTrackerForm : public  
      Tizen::Media::ICameraEventListener {
  
     public:
         void OnCameraPreviewed(
                      Tizen::Base::ByteBuffer& previewedData,     
                       result r) {
             ArrayList *pList = null;
             ByteBuffer* pBuffer = new (std::nothrow)
             ByteBuffer();
             pBuffer->Construct(previewedData);
             pList = new (std::nothrow) ArrayList;
             pList->Construct();
             pList->InsertAt (*pBuffer, 0);
         }
  ...
Figure 7: Example for Event Handler
In the example above, the FaceTrackerForm
class implements an interface function called
OnCameraPreviewed() exposed by the
Tizen::Media::ICameraEventListener class.
The ICameraEventListener class is meant to
provide callback functions to retrieve data in an
event-driven fashion. In the example above, the
OnCameraPreviewed() function retrieves the captured
snapshot packaged as a (Tizen) ByteBuffer.
To handle callback functions in our taint analysis, the
input rules make use of a type attribute, where for call-
backs the type is set to event. These extra attributes
compensate for our desire not to include the entirety of
the Tizen system libraries as part of our information flow
analysis of potentially hostile apps. Instead, we only
need to annotate the various library entry points and their
callback behaviors.
4.4 Ranking of Vulnerabilities
The output of the taint analysis is a prioritized list of
vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability rule assigns a sever-
ity level. For instance, leaking one’s location might be
considered to be a lower severity than leaking one’s SMS
messages. The vulnerabilities detected by taint analysis
are ranked primarily according to their severity and sec-
ondarily according to the distance between source and
sink in the application, under an assumption that a longer
distance from source to sink represents less of a security
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threat. Of course, all of this is still reported to the human
analyst.
Where vulnerabilities have the same severity level,
their relative ranking is based on their distance metrics.
A shorter distance results in a higher rank. The attributes
call_distance and control_distance define a metric for
the distance between the source and the sink in the ap-
plication. The call_distance value is one if the path
from the source to the sink includes a function call and
is zero otherwise. Where the source dominates the sink
in the control dependence graph, the control distance is
the length of the path between them. Where the source
does not dominate the sink, the control distance is the
sum of the distances between each node and their least
common ancestor. The control_distance value is only
relevant when the value of call_distance is zero.
As in [37], the ranking of the vulnerabilities can be
used to sort them so that the most likely errors appear
closer to the top of the vulnerability list generated by the
taint analysis. A tunable cutoff threshold (e.g., top 100)
of the vulnerabilities can be included in the output report.
A smaller threshold will decrease the false positive rate
but increase the false negative rate.
4.5 Tizen Application Analysis Evaluation
4.5.1 Tizen Application Analysis Results
We wrote a rule set for Tizen application analysis, based
on Tizen security policies. Using our tool, we were able
to find unexpected behavior for an application.
We used 30 Tizen sample native applications, which
were the only available applications during the time of
this research. We created rules to detect privacy leaks and
unauthorized resource accesses involving the file system.
These are among the security vulnerabilities that Tizen-
Store.com would check for to ensure the safety of Tizen
apps prior to being downloaded to Tizen users. For both
cases, rules consist of one taint source API and one or
more taint sink APIs. We also checked colluding apps,
which needs support for identifying taint pairs cross IPC
cals. For this case, we created two rule sets for collud-
ing applications (one for “producer” applications with
information flow from the SMS to IPC calls), and one
for “consumer” applications with information flow from
IPC calls to File). The two rule sets are marked that the
analysis engine can recognize them and apply them as
producer/consumer pattern,
Our tool identified one privacy leak in the
FriendFinder application without any false pos-
itives or false negatives. In the FriendFinder
application’s ConnectionManager class, there is a
function GetImagePathPtr that retrieves the path
information as a string. In the same function, there
is a BluetoothOppClient::PushFile function that
takes the output string of GetImagePathPtr. This
induces a privacy leak because the GetImagePathPtr
API is obtaining a profile picture (i.e., file name)
of the user and sending it to another device via the
BluetoothOppClient::PushFile API.
With a finding like this, an analyst looking at this re-
port might conclude that FriendFinder is operating as ex-
pected, sending profile pictures through the Bluetooth
connection would seem to be an expected behavior for
the app. If there were a flow to the network, however,
then the analyst would have reason for concern and might
take action to ban the app.
4.5.2 Tizen Application Analysis Performance
We ran SIFA on a quad-core Intel Xeon 2.66GHz work-
station with 8GB of memory and running RedHat Linux
(RHEL 5). The largest application is MediaApp, which
contains 129,375 bitcode instructions. MediaApp took
the longest time to analyze: it took 22.82 seconds for
total execution. The analysis, which includes the re-
lated LLVM analysis pre-passes, pointer analysis, and
interprocedural taint analysis, took 20.351 seconds. Our
experiment shows that the tool can consume more than
10,000 LLVM bitcode instructions per second (i.e., about
3,000 lines of C++ code per second) on average. We
also measured peak memory usage using Valgrind and
the largest memory consumption came from MediaApp,
which required 3.098GB.
1000	  
10000	  
100000	  
1000000	  
An
im
a)
on
Ap
p	  
Ap
pS
e.
ng
	  
Ba
sic
Ap
p	  
Ca
lc
ul
at
or
	  
Ca
le
nd
ar
Vi
ew
er
	  
Ci
ph
er
M
es
sa
ge
	  
Di
c)
on
ar
y	  
Di
c)
on
ar
yD
at
aC
on
tr
ol
	  
Di
c)
on
ar
yD
at
aC
on
tr
ol
Pr
ov
id
er
	  
Dr
aw
in
gB
oa
rd
	  
Eff
ec
ts
Ap
p	  
Fa
ce
Re
co
gn
ize
r	  
Fa
ce
Tr
ac
ke
r	  
Fr
ie
nd
Fi
nd
er
	  
Ga
lle
ry
Li
ve
bo
xP
ro
vi
de
r	  
Gl
es
Cu
be
	  
Gl
es
Cu
be
11
	  
Gl
es
Sh
ad
er
	  
HM
pC
lie
nt
	  
Hy
br
id
Se
rv
ic
eA
pp
	  
Js
on
Pa
rs
er
Ap
p	  
Li
ve
bo
xV
ie
w
er
	  
Lo
ca
lC
on
te
nt
	  
Lo
ca
)o
nM
an
ag
er
	  
M
ed
ia
Ap
p	  
U
iC
on
tr
ol
An
im
at
or
	  
U
iC
on
tr
ol
s	  
U
iV
isu
al
El
em
en
t	  
W
eb
Vi
ew
er
	  
Xm
lP
ar
se
rA
pp
	  
Bitcodes	  per	  second	  
Figure 8: Tizen Application Analysis Throughput
For contrast, we note that Google’s Play Store for An-
droid introduces several hours of latency between when
an app is submitted and when it becomes live for produc-
tion. The CPU and time costs for performing our infor-
mation flow analysis are negligible compared to the time
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a human analyst might spend understanding them and
considering whether the results are appropriate for the
app’s claimed functionality. And, of course, as the vol-
ume of submitted apps grow, standard cluster resources
can be used to conduct concurrent analyses, indepen-
dently, with human analysts engaging after the analyses
are complete.
5 Tizen API Analysis
Tizen API analysis (TAA) identifies paths from native
API calls to low-level system (Linux) kernel calls to test
for potential violations of user privileges. It performs
a dataflow analysis on top of the call graph to identify
information flow. Here the propagated information is the
set of user privileges exercised along call paths.
The user-specified privilege rules are inputs to the
analysis, defined as:
1. A set of (source, sink) pairs, where each source is a
native API call and each sink is a glibc call, which
is a wrapper for a kernel call;
2. A set of user privilege properties (UPVS) that call
paths from the source to the sink, for each (source,
sink) pair.
TAA traverses the call graph in a top-down manner
from each entry function (the call graph here is a for-
est), and starts a new call path trace when a source call
is identified. An entry function here is an event handler
function in the Tizen OS code base. The call path trace is
performed on the call graph by means of HSSA. For each
path in the library code base, the TAA collects the set of
user privileges (PVS) exercised along the call path and
stored the call path into a candidate list when a sink call
is identified. The privilege is checked from a CheckUser-
Privilege function call but the user can also specify other
special function calls for identifying user privileges. A
call path is a potential violation of user privilege proper-
ties, iff its PVS contains an element that is not in UPVS
(i.e. PVS is not a subset of UPVS).
Figure 9 (a) shows an example where the code base
contains a user-specified source: TizenNativeAPI, sink:
glibcCall, and the check privilege function: CheckUser-
Priv. There is a call path from ButtonEvent→ evaluate
→ BlueToothOp. There are two user privileges exercised
in this call path: PRV_1 and PRV_2. Figure 9 (b) gives
the HSSA version of the code (only function based uphi
nodes need to be considered in this analysis), and the
arrow lines show the progress of updating PVS in the
HSSA def-use traversal for call path.
The output of TAA is a list of such call paths that po-
tentially violate user privilege properties. The output in-
cludes the source Tizen API function, the sink Linux ker-
  void ButtonEvent() {
     … 
     x= TizenNativeAPI();    
     …
     CheckUserPriv(PRV_1);
     ..
     evaluate(p);
     …
  }
  void evaluate(Info* p) {
     …
     CheckUserPriv(PRV_2);
     …
     BlueToothOp();
     …
  }
  void BlueToothOp() {
     ...
     glibcCall(m);
  ...
a.
  void ButtonEvent() {
     … 
     x= TizenNativeAPI();  H1 = uphi(H0) 
     …
     CheckUserPriv(PRV_1); H2 = uphi(H1)
     ..
     evaluate(p); H3 = uphi(H2)
     …
  }
  void evaluate(Info* p) {
     …
     CheckUserPriv(PRV_2); H11 = uphi(H0)
     …
     BlueToothOp(); H12 = uphi(H11)
     …
  }
  void BlueToothOp() {
     ...
     glibcCall(m); H21 = uphi(H0)
  ...
b.
PVS = {}
PVS = {PRV_1}
PVS = 
{PRV_1, PRV_2}
Figure 9: Example of Tizen API Analysis
nel function, and the full call path from source to sink.
This analysis can lead to false positives and false nega-
tives. Since this SIFA runs on API library, it can be ex-
tended to model additional security issues, such as unau-
thorized resource access.
5.1 Tizen API Analysis Evaluation
We wrote a rule set for Tizen API analysis based on the
Tizen security policies discussed above. Using our tool,
we were able to find several unexpected behaviors of the
Tizen APIs.
5.1.1 Tizen API Analysis Results
For the Tizen API analysis, we started with a simple rule
to test whether Tizen enforced privilege checks for the
privileged APIs. Our tool located a privileged API which
didn’t follow the API documentation [45]. This bug
allows applications to receive push notifications with-
out owning one of the two required privileges. While
this API requires _PRV_PUSH and _PRV_HTTP accord-
ing to the API documentation, it only checks for the
_PRV_PUSH privilege. Our tool detected this inconsis-
tency.
Furthermore, we found two API calls which have the
functionality of registering an application to the applica-
tion launcher so it can run when a specified condition is
met (comparable to an Android app’s ability to register
to receive a broadcast intent). One API call can regis-
ter any application while the other can only register its
caller. Our tool detected that the broader API call is vul-
nerable in that it doesn’t have a required privilege check
while the other API has it. Thinking we found a sig-
nificant vulnerability, we dug deeper and followed the
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subsequent execution path manually. We ultimately dis-
covered that the app launcher, itself, which receives these
calls makes its own security checks. While this finding
could be interpreted as a false positive, the discrepancy
between security checks taking place on different levels
for the same mechanism is something that deserves man-
ual scrutiny. Our tool allowed us to focus our attention on
an API call that indeed appeared to have an exploitable
hole.
Our analysis also highlighted several InputMethod
APIs. None of the InputMethod’s privileged APIs had
privilege checks, including the SendText API. Again, we
manually followed the calls and discovered that, unlike
other classes’ privilege checks, InputMethod enforced
privilege checks in GetInstance when the application re-
trieves an instance of InputMethod. In this respect, In-
putMethod follows something of a capability-style of ac-
cess control (i.e., if you hold a valid instance, then you
must be allowed to use it). So, while we again didn’t find
a vulnerability, we did find a coding style at odds with
the way the rest of the APIs do their security checks, de-
serving of additional scrutiny.
Lastly, we wrote another rule that detects flows from
the privileged APIs to non-privileged APIs. The intu-
ition behind this rule is that if a privileged API only uses
non-privileged APIs, the privilege check is unnecessary.
We found a privileged API which deletes all cookies in
an application that could be replicated only using non-
privileged APIs. While this doesn’t indicate a security
hole, it does validate that our tools is capable of discover-
ing both missing security checks as well as unnecessary
ones.
Overall, while we’re modestly disappointed that we
didn’t find any security flaws, we note that a massive
codebase like Tizen, with a large stable of developers
contributing new code on a regular basis, creates logis-
tical challenges for the security analysts trying to keep
up with it. A tool like ours, running as part of a nightly
build system, allows an analyst to detect new flows and
control paths that might have innocently introduced se-
curity vulnerabilities.
5.1.2 Tizen API Analysis Performance
Our analysis ran on a quad-core Intel Core i7-3770
3.50GHz workstation with 8GB of memory, running Fe-
dora Linux and LLVM 3.3. The test bed is a part of the
Tizen platform consisting of 4,346 C/C++ files compiled
into LLVM bitcode files with a total size of 560MB. The
analysis time for generating the call paths for all APIs
took 122.5 secs with memory usage under 8GB. This is
fast enough that it could reasonably run not only as part
of a nightly build process but as part of a regular devel-
oper’s source code commit process, flagging new flows
before the change hits the code repository.
6 Pragmatic Issues
Our static analysis tool leverages the LLVM analysis in-
frastructure and so depends on the use of the LLVM com-
piler. For the Tizen native application analysis, LLVM/-
Clang is the default compiler. However, the Tizen plat-
form code is compiled using GCC. To compile the Tizen
platform code with LLVM, we had to address issues that
other large-scale static analysis tools — such as Coverity
— also had to address when processing real-world soft-
ware: the issues raised by standards, language dialects
and compiler variations [15]. In short, to use the LLVM
infrastructure, we had to make two changes to the Tizen
source distribution.
First, we needed to change the compiler from GCC to
Clang, which generates the LLVM bitcode that is input to
the LLVM analysis infrastructure. Since GCC and Clang
are not completely compatible [13], this step involved
manual inspection of each module. We edited each build
file and made source code changes as needed to remove
errors. Changes, in some cases, included editing of as-
sembly code.
Second, Tizen uses a variety of different build sys-
tems (CMake, libtool, and traditional makefiles). Con-
sequently, each module is a new adventure in software
porting, both in terms of the initial compilation step and
as well in terms of linking.
Consequently, we had to decide when we had enough
coverage to validate our tool and approach. The Tizen
source is divided into different source packages and we
successfully compiled 159 out of 390 Tizen framework
packages to LLVM bitcode, generating more than 4,000
LLVM bitcode files with a total size of 560MB. We com-
piled all the packages from the top two layers: OSP and
the CAPI layer, which handles the native application. We
picked underlying components’ packages that were di-
rectly relevant to the privileged APIs such as telephone,
messaging, system, and etc. We did not compile pack-
ages that were not relevant to the privileged APIs such as
graphics, UI, and multimedia.
A full analysis, of course, would need to push the en-
tirety of the Tizen codebase through LLVM, and this ef-
fort would need to be replicated each and every time
the analysis was to be conducted. If our vision of our
tool being closely integrated in the Tizen build environ-
ment were to ever take off, Tizen would realistically need
to switch to LLVM as its production compiler. With
LLVM in production use by a number of very promi-
nent projects, include Apple’s iOS / OS X, this isn’t an
unreasonable recommendation.
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7 Related Work
7.1 Static analysis of production code
Static analysis has been proven to be successful in find-
ing bugs in real-world programs. Coverity [15] and
Fortify [30] are well-known commercial static analysis
tools. An article by Bessey, et al. [16] discusses a num-
ber of pragmatic issues and experiences with respect to
static analysis tools for finding bugs for large commer-
cial code bases (up to 20-30 MLOC). They observe that
"the false positive rate is simplistic since false positives
are not all equal and initial reports matter inordinately".
Both Fortify [30] and Coverity emphasize results prior-
itization once vulnerabilities are identified. Our ranking
and cutoff analysis (Section 4) also addresses this issue.
We discuss related ranking work in Section 7.3.
IBM AppScan Source [31] is a tool meant to iden-
tify bugs during the development phase for web applica-
tions. Other editions of IBM AppScan identify general
bugs while focusing on security problems in particular
and supporting customizable rules.
FindBugs [6], a static analysis tool used on Google
code bases, focuses more on identifying common Java
programming bugs rather than security vulnerabilities in
particular. The importance of the tool’s UI with respect
to the speed of understanding and fixing bugs has been
demonstated [5] (analysts processed bugs in FindBugs
faster than with Fortify). The tool was used to show that
bugs found in older code bases are less likely to be fixed
once discovered [7].
ESC/JAVA [24] is a static analysis tool, pow-
ered by verification-condition generation and automatic
theorem-proving techniques, for Java that checks for
common programming errors. While it does find errors,
users have to annotate the software and the annotation
burden is quite high. It also suffers from excessive spu-
rious warnings on programs that are annotated.
Metal [29] is a language for programmer-written com-
piler extensions that express a broad range of correctness
rules that code must obey. The system xgcc executes
these extensions using a context-sensitive interprocedu-
ral analysis. Metal is designed for system programmers
with an emphasis on ease of use, and makes use of state
machines as a fundamental abstraction. This approach
has been used to find thousands of bugs in real systems
code.
7.2 Security analysis of mobile applica-
tions
Privilege escalation attacks on mobile applications are
known to the community. In particular, the vulnerabil-
ity of Android applications [18] is well known. Android,
like Tizen, is a permissions-based mobile operating sys-
tem, so analysis of possible permission leak vulnerabili-
ties is also needed for it.
ScanDroid [25] was the first static analysis tool for
Android to detect information flow violations. The tool
detects inter-application security risks and needs to have
access to both the vulnerable application and the ex-
ploitable application. To the best of our knowledge,
SCanDroid is not easily extensible with new taint prop-
agation rules, unlike SIFA which is designed from the
ground up for supporting custom rules.
FlowDroid [3] is a static taint-analysis tool for An-
droid applications, based on the Heros FDS/IDE solver
and the Soot Java analysis framework. It models the
Android application life cycle, including multiple entry
points, asynchronously executing components, and call-
backs. It performs context-, flow-, field-, and object-
sensitive analyses to discover vulnerabilities in applica-
tions. FlowDroid has excellent performance because it
performs on demand alias analysis, but as described in
FlowDroid [3] it does not handle implicit flows through
control dependences.
Grace et al. [27] focus on static analysis of stock An-
droid firmware and identify confused deputy attacks that
enable the use of permission-protected capabilities. Our
application analysis is complementary in that it identifies
not only actions that are performed, but information that
flows to attackers. Our focus is not on stock applications,
but on third-party applications.
CHEX [40], relies on taint analysis to discover permis-
sion leaks in Android applications. CHEX detects sev-
eral types of vulnerabilities affecting Android applica-
tions, including permission-protected information leaks.
The CHEX analysis is similar to our application anal-
ysis, but relies on a model of the OS libraries rather
than analyzing them directly. This avoids handling the
multi-language analysis difficulties that Tizen and An-
droid have.
TaintDroid [19] uses dynamic taint tracking to identify
protected information flows that reach Android network
communication APIs (sinks). Advantages of performing
this analysis dynamically are increased precision, as well
as enforcement of the safe use of vulnerable applications
by denying users the capability to externalize their sen-
sitive information during application use. The advantage
of static analysis tools such as SIFA is their capability of
detecting vulnerable applications before they even reach
the user.
ComDroid [12] is a tool that analyses inter-application
communication in Android. ComDroid does not track
permission-leak vulnerabilities and none of the dis-
covered vulnerabilities described pertain to permission-
protected information. Contributions such as automatic
rule generation separate our work from theirs.
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Kirin [44, 20] is a tool based on a formal represen-
tation of the Android security model that checks if ap-
plications meet security policies. It can check for con-
fused deputy vulnerabilities (“unchecked interface”), In-
tent spoofing (“intent origin”) and other attacks by us-
ing a powerful Prolog-based security policy enforcement
mechanism, which takes into consideration the set of
applications already installed on a device. The authors
point out several difficulties with creating information
flow policies in Android and discuss the future possibil-
ity of including source code analysis to make information
flow policies for Android of practical use.
Felt et al. [22] map Android API calls to permissions
based on automated testing rather than static analysis,
which means incomplete coverage and the possibility of
false negatives in the permissions map. They do not use
the map to check for information flow-based vulnerabil-
ities in applications. PScout [4] builds a permission map
for Android through static analysis based on Soot.
A different aspect of the flow vulnerabilities is de-
scribed by Claudio Marforio et al., whose work focuses
on colluding applications [41]. They identify several
possible covert channels through which malevolent ap-
plications can communicate sensitive information, for
example by enumerating processes using native code or
files. Most of these however are not Android specific.
They did not build a tool to detect flow vulnerabilities.
They identify security risks for colluding applications in
modern permission-based operating systems.
The PermissionFlow tool [51] performs a static
dataflow analysis to identify sources of information pro-
tected by permissions in Android and a taint analysis to
check if this information reaches other applications or
leaks outside the device. The source APIs are, in contrast
to the work of Felt et al., obtained through static analysis.
PermissionFlow does not offer any support for implicit
flows. Bartel et al. [9] propose a similar taint analysis and
both were able to find vulnerabilities in commercial ap-
plications, highlighting the importance of performing a
corresponding analysis on Tizen applications. — which
is what our tool does.
7.3 Results Ranking
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to use er-
ror ranking and cutoff as means to reduce the false posi-
tive rate in security analysis, but there is a long history
of using these techniques in static analysis tools. We
use error ranking to both suppress false positives and to
prominently display errors that are considered to be of
importance to the user. The goal of report prioritization
is to display errors according to their importance to the
user. An article by Bessey, et al. [15] observes that the
most prominently displayed reports are critical and have
a strong impact on the user’s perception of the quality of
the tool.
An early tool to use error ranking for results of a
static analysis is Prefix [10], which focuses on analysis
of memory allocation and usage errors in C. It was an
essential tool for improving the reliability of Windows
OS[17]. Because of the high volume of warnings gen-
erated, Prefix uses a set of ad hoc filters to improve the
relevance of the warnings displayed.
Several tools, such as Z-Ranking [37], Feedback-
ranking [36] and Airac [33] propose the idea of using
statistical modeling to obtain better ranking of positives.
Kremenek observed [36] that bugs often cluster by code
locality and attributes this characteristic to the observa-
tion that programmers who do violate a particular pro-
gramming rule tend to violate it multiple times. Code
locality plays a role in our ranking function too, but the
correlation is instead between the confidence in a result
being a true positive and the code span of the taint.
FindBugs [7] performs report prioritization by com-
bining several factors such as confidence in a result and
the seriousness of the bug. In our system, report prior-
itization is accomplished by sorting security violations
according to severity. As with our work, the severity
is provided based on user-specified values in the input
taint rules. EspX [28] classifies bugs in different buck-
ets based on both its confidence in the error being a true
positive and on the severity of the bug. Fixing all bugs in
designated buckets was a requirement to integrate code
in the Windows OS [17].
7.4 Implicit Flow
In this section, we compare SIFA with other work in
the area of analysis of implicit flows. The implicit
flows considered here only include control flows and not
covert channels which in general cannot be secured with
software-only approaches. The importance and difficulty
of handling implicit flow is presented in numerous stud-
ies [35, 11]. The detection of implicit flows by either
static or dynamic analysis has proven to be challenging.
We have developed a static taint analysis that unifies im-
plicit and explicit information flows in a single analysis
mechanism.
Liu and Milanova [38] develop a context-sensitive in-
terprocedural static information flow inference analysis
which performs security type inference. A security type
system requires the annotation of variables and state-
ments with security types, which are labels that denote
security levels [42]. They handle both explicit and im-
plicit flows. Their method captures control dependences
through adding implicit flow edges and paths, some of
which are annotated by the analysis. They perform a
static taint analysis based on this representation.
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Genaim and Spoto [26] present an information flow
analysis for both explicit and implicit flows for full
(mono-threaded) Java bytecode. They build a control
flow graph that represents the complex control features
of Java bytecode. For efficiency, they represent informa-
tion flows through Boolean functions. They treat fields
as static (i.e., global) class variables, and so do not dis-
tinguish flow between the same field of multiple objects
of a given class, a significant source of imprecision. In
contrast, we model objects using Heap SSA form, and
so distinguish between the instances of the same field in
different objects.
While taint analysis is effective for detecting a wide
range of attacks on benign software, Cavallero, et al. [11]
show that it is not as effective for detecting attacks due
to malicious software. In particular, they present sim-
ple and powerful evasion techniques, used in untrusted
x86 binaries, that elude static and dynamic taint-tracking
techniques. They report that enhancing taint analysis to
reason about control dependences, as our method does,
improves evasion resistance but results in a high rate of
false positives. This could limit the usefulness of such
techniques, given the wide use of binary-based software
distribution and employment models. This difficulty mo-
tivates the use of trusted LLVM bitcodes as a distribution
format.
King, et al. [35] experimentally investigate the value
of tracking implicit flows through the security-typed lan-
guage JLift, an extension of Jif. They find that implicit
flow checking can be valuable, in terms of identifying
true leaks of secret information, but produces a high
(83%) rate of false positives (over-tainting), in particu-
lar due to unchecked exceptions.
It has been shown that purely dynamic techniques can-
not detect certain implicit flows [58], so the applica-
tion of dynamic taint analysis to implicit flows results
in false negatives. However to mitigate the issue of static
over-tainting, dynamic taint analysis has been applied to
implicit flows through techniques that selectively prop-
agate taints along a targeted subset of control depen-
dences [34, 8, 14]. Our use of ranking and cutoff can
also be used to mitigate over-tainting.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
Analyzing the security of a large software platform like
Tizen presents a valuable opportunity to apply state-
of-the-art tools in static analysis. Static analysis can
be usefully applied to identify undesirable behaviors
in apps distributed through app stores, and it can help
the system’s developers find needle-in-a-haystack bugs
throughout their system. While we had a limited li-
brary of apps to consider, we were able to achieve very
good analysis performance and were able to identify non-
trivial information flows that could be dangerous in un-
trusted apps. Similarly, by processing a substantial frac-
tion of the Tizen codebase, we were able to identify
a handful of locations where important security checks
were missing; subsequent manual analysis determined
that subsequent software layers made checks that pre-
vented these initial mistakes from becoming exploitable.
Our work additionally demonstrates the value of a
general-purpose infrastructure like LLVM. While this
project focused on C and C++ code, our analyses could
potentially run on any programming language for which
there’s an LLVM front-end. For example, a JavaScript
front-end for LLVM would allow our tools to analyze
“web apps” in addition to “native apps” with identical
information flow rules.
Furthermore, the extensions we made to LLVM, such
as our class hierarchy analysis, are general-purpose and
could well be folded back into the LLVM distribution.
(We intend to make an open source release of our ex-
tensions.) We hypothesize that the increased precision
of our analyses will enable dynamic dispatches to be
replaced with static function calls, as well as allowing
for better function inlining and other performance ben-
efits. Evaluating this performance impact represents fu-
ture work.
Now that Samsung has shipped its first Tizen products
and real apps are starting to appear in its online app store,
we expect that independent security analysts will be able
to download these apps, in bulk, and analyze them as
many security analysts have already done for Android
and iOS. The Tizen platform is still in its early days as
a consumer product, creating opportunities for the plat-
form’s security features to get ahead of attackers.
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